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Workers and Politics in the Immigrant City in the 
Early Twentieth-Century United States 
Cecelia F. Bucki 
Fairfield University 
A consideration of workers and politics in the early twentieth-century 
United States must take into account a variety of changes that confronted 
the working class in this era: the fashioning of a new national state role, the 
remaking of politics, and finally the remaking of the working class itself. 
Analysis of American politics in this particular era has been dominated by 
the paradigm of "The System of 1896" and the model of urban "machine 
politics." These two concepts represent a widely accepted framework of 
analysis that demonstrates the integration of the working class into the 
political system and the consequent muting of class concerns within that 
system. Our task is to investigate these concepts to measure their useful 
ness in explaining working-class consciousness and its impact on politics. 
Specifically, the investigation must examine the dynamics of local-level 
politics, where working-people's activities had their greatest strength and 
resonance. This essay will examine these ideas and suggest an alternative 
understanding of the politics of workers, and especially of immigrants, in 
this era. 
At the turn of the century, the United States had recovered from the 
economic and political turmoil of the 1890s depression and entered three 
decades of political stability known as the "System of 1896." This system 
emerged after the 1896 defeat of the Democratic-Populist fusion by the 
Republican party. As defined by E. E. Schattschneider and Walter Dean 
Burnham, it was characterized by the national hegemony of the Republi 
can party (outside the Democratic "Solid South"); the narrowing of politi 
cal debate; and a diminished party vitality, which was replaced by an ex 
panding administrative state. In addition, as revealed in declining rates of 
turnout for national elections, the electoral system of 1896-1928 was one 
of demobilization of an alarmingly large portion of the potential electorate 
in the United States.1 
This shrinking of the American electorate has been attributed to a 
combination of an extreme one-party dominance in both the North and 
South and the cumulative impact of institutional change and changes in the 
rules of the game for voters. Republican hegemony in the North and Dem 
ocratic hegemony in the South went hand in hand with what Burnham has 
called "the decomposition of political parties as action instrumentalities."2 
One-party rule deprived voters of meaningful choices, thus leading to a 
decline in voter turnout. Moreover, as Burnham argued, interest groups 
had taken over the political functions of bringing issues to bear on the 
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state, so the political parties themselves no longer generated issues of 
concern to voters. Concurrently, a wave of electoral reforms, such as the 
direct primary, the reform trilogy of initiative-referendum-recall, the 
Australian ballot, nonpartisan elections, and antifusion legislation had 
weakened the partisan nature of politics. In addition, these reforms ham 
pered third-party challenges. The result was a decline in competition in the 
electoral arena and indifference on the part of the electorate.3 
Moreover, changes in the rules governing access to the ballot had a 
deliberate antidemocratic thrust. Personal registration laws, extended re 
sidency requirements, literacy tests, and, in the South, poll taxes were 
intended to make voting more difficult for immigrants, African Americans, 
and lower-class citizens generally.4 By 1920, a new pattern of class and age 
stratification in turnout appeared, with upper-class and older voters the 
more active participants. The turnout also had a gender bias after the 
granting of women's suffrage in 1920, though women's lesser participation 
was not enough to explain away the overall lowered turnout. By the 1920s, 
an entire generation, including waves of new immigrants, had grown up 
under a system of lessening involvement in electoral politics. 
However, this description of the "System of 1896" belies the political 
tumult of the Progressive Era, the range of issues brought to the electoral 
arena, and the persistent and sometimes successful (on the local level) 
challenge by third parties like the Socialist party. This would suggest that, 
while Burnham's theory about the reshaping of the "political universe" can 
be useful, it may hamper rather than help our investigation of working 
class politics. In particular, it does little to explain the shaping of working 
class party loyalties. 
This was a time when leaders of the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) were accepting the framework of corporate capitalism and attempt 
ing to cement their position within the state through alliance with the 
Democratic party and with cooperative employers through the National 
Civic Federation.5 Native-born American workers, Yankee as well as "old 
stock" ethnic, were already deeply involved in politics, both on the nation 
al and local level. Moderate craft unionists had acquiesced to patronage 
politics, and the AFL's "voluntarism" was aimed at a pragmatic accom 
modation to gain favors from whatever party promised to attend to labor's 
political agenda. While middle-class Progressive Era reformers were at 
tempting to limit working-class political participation and to reform munic 
ipal government to run the city like a business, reform allies of the working 
class were pressing ahead with social and labor legislation. This "urban 
liberalism" agenda linked "old-stock" workingmen to the Democratic, or 
sometimes the Republican, urban political organizations.6 
Urban politics was an area of decisive importance for working-class 
political identity and mobilization, as well as ideological formation, since 
much direct confrontation between workers and the state occurred on the 
local level. Through most of the nineteenth century, workers attempted to 
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gain a measure of political power at the municipal level for instrumental 
purposes?in order to punish the existing office-holders who had not ad 
hered to prolabor policies, to curtail local or state police repression of 
labor activities, to achieve prolabor legislation?or to enhance the quality 
of life for workers and their neighborhoods by providing services and pro 
tection from the ravages of the laissez-faire marketplace. Sometimes 
working-class politics aimed at larger ideological purposes such as chal 
lenging corporate control over government and handing government back 
to "the people" or "the producing classes." This took the form of either 
promoting worker candidates within the two major parties or, as was often 
the case in the nineteenth century, forming independent parties.7 
But these attempts were short-lived (whether successful or not) and 
workers fell back on their reliance on the two-party arrangement and its 
local embodiment, the political machine. Indeed, historically oriented po 
litical scientists such as Amy Bridges and Martin Shefter, both using New 
York City in different eras in the nineteenth century as their test case, 
argue that the political machine was the solution to class crisis, defusing 
class tensions by building an accommodation among the various social and 
economic groups in the city. Moreover, party solicitation of working-class 
loyalty, while playing on class sensibilities and rewarding workers with 
labor legislation, shaped the consciousness of workers through appeals to 
ethnicity and community and thus turned workers away from strictly class 
based politics. The creation of partisan identification among American 
workers has been seen as a distinctively American trait, and machine poli 
tics likewise has been viewed as a component of American exceptional 
ism.8 
However, as Richard Oestreicher has pointed out, the seeming domi 
nance of ethnocultural, rather than class-based, political preferences in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may have had more to do with the 
structure of American politics than with any measure of political conscious 
ness among working people, or, as Ira Katznelson has argued, separate 
spheres of consciousness at home and at work. Three structural facts de 
fined the American political system?an entrenched two-party system, 
winner-take-all elections, and relative fragmentation of power in the layers 
of local, state, and national government?and all contributed to the limited 
ability of class-based issues and organizations to make their impact on the 
polity.9 
An additional theory regarding working-class integration into the two 
party system early in the history of the Republic was the "free gift of the 
ballot." This, too, is part of a larger American exceptionalism argument, 
which, along with such factors as American ideological disposition, the lack 
of a feudal past, relative prosperity, and chances for social mobility, has 
explained the "lack" of class consciousness and a viable socialist party in 
the United States.10 This "free ballot" formulation has to be qualified by 
the fact that paupers and the foreign-born were often disfranchised and 
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residency and registration rules and poll taxes often impeded other 
working-class white men from exercising their franchise. These barriers 
grew more formidable after the 1890s. African-American men had diffi 
culty after receiving the vote in 1870, even before the regime of the New 
South succeeded in disfranchising them by the 1890s.11 Working-class 
women, of course, did not receive the vote in most states until 1920. 
Moreover, as Richard L. McCormick notes, the new immigrants of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not as completely mobilized 
into the dominant political structure as were the Irish and German immi 
grants of an earlier era; thus they were less assimilated into the political 
parties of the Progressive Era.12 It was only in the 1930s that the white 
working class as a whole overcame the impediments to its exercise of the 
franchise, including its own internal splits. We thus need to examine the 
structures of voter mobilization before we can assess working-class ideas 
about citizenship. 
It has been assumed that urban machine politics manipulated and 
absorbed workers into a consensual, nonoppositional political order. But 
while "machine politics" is an appealing shorthand for the complex task of 
ideological development and voter mobilization in the nineteenth century, 
the concept assumes what needs to be proved. "Machine politics" neither 
predicts nor reveals the dynamics of decision-making and patterns of power 
in the city, nor does it reveal?indeed, it denies?the ideological motiva 
tions for voting. "Patronage democracy" is a much more apt, and less 
deterministic, term for the nineteenth-century pattern of party politics.13 
While patronage democracy became a hegemonic model for urban 
politics, radical and socialist organizations saw their political task as one of 
weaning workers away from this model. The commodification of politics 
was repeatedly challenged in the nineteenth century by class-based politics. 
The Knights of Labor, Greenback-Labor party, and finally the Socialist 
party attempted to gain a foothold in the electoral arena. The Socialist 
party was successful in the short term and had its greatest strength in areas 
of working-class home ownership and union power.14 
From 1880 to 1920, the working class itself was being remade by the 
waves of new immigrants, mostly from Eastern and Southern Europe, who 
came to the United States in search of work. While this free-flowing immi 
gration kept the class in flux until restriction legislation after World War I, 
immigrant workers began to make their presence known in attempts to 
unionize in such industries as coal mining, meatpacking, textiles, and gar 
ments, in radical organizations like the Industrial Workers of the World 
(IWW), and in the nationality federations of the Socialist party. Contacts 
between native-born workers from "old-stock" groups (British, Irish, Ger 
man, and Scandinavian) and the new immigrants complicated the process 
of class formation. To create a successful movement, the working-class cul 
ture of "old-stock" ethnics, who had already established their unions and 
built links to politics, had to accommodate the emerging class culture of 
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new immigrants, who had their own labor and political traditions. The 
migration of African Americans and Mexicans into industrial regions dur 
ing and after World War I added to the complexity. While this process 
could lead to "Americanization from the bottom up," it also bred nativism 
and racism among native-born workers. This turmoil was reflected in union 
debates over inclusion of new workers, whether by race, gender, or skill 
categories, in political debates over the role of unions in politics, and in the 
stance the AFL should take on immigration restriction.15 
The effort to secure the cohesiveness and influence of immigrant com 
munities within this political structure was shaped by their own internal 
class dynamics. We need to historicize the social construction of ethnicity in 
the early twentieth-century United States in order to comprehend how 
immigrant workers saw themselves in American society and how they "fit" 
into an emerging American citizenship.16 The patterns of ethnic identity 
building and their relation to American society have quite different ele 
ments before and after World War I. World War I is a watershed both 
because immigration was restricted after the war and because the war 
heightened coercive American patriotism at the same time as nationalist 
aspirations for European immigrants were being realized. We will examine 
each era in turn. 
Immigrant group leaders?in the early period usually community pi 
oneers and economic notables who were committed to long-term residence 
in this era of "birds-of-passage"?presided over the myriad fraternal and 
welfare-oriented organizations and raised the banner of community self 
help. The web of organizations created by immigrant pioneers prior to 1914 
served the collective survival needs of immigrants and preserved family and 
community cohesion in the New World. Drawing on Old World organiza 
tional traditions, people built on the kinship- and village-based chain mi 
gration from Eastern and Southern Europe to create the mutual benefit 
organizations, Landsmanschaf ten, soci?t?s di mutuo soccorso, religious 
communities, parish councils, ladies' sodalities, and athletic and singing 
societies that dotted immigrant colonies. In the absence of national govern 
ment social-welfare programs, these provided sickness and accident insur 
ance and death benefits. They also promoted recreational and social activ 
ities, embodied the moral ideals of the community, and often monitored 
the conduct of community members. At this level of organization, associa 
tions were based on shared identities of kinship, customs, dialect, and 
often religion. These organizations mirrored the regional and religious 
differences within immigrants' homelands, thus reinforcing small-scale 
community cohesion. Group life in the personal worlds of family and com 
munity generated organizations and leaders whose primary focus was in 
ward.17 
The public world of opinion formation, group representation, and 
politics in the larger American society generated a distinct level of leader 
ship, that of "brokers" or mediators who "Janus-like 
. . . face in two direc 
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tions at once," as the anthropologist Eric Wolf has observed.18 The points 
of contact between the immigrant and American worlds bristled with cul 
tural and political conflict and thus required the services of ethnic spokes 
persons as buffers or intermediaries. The brokers walked a fine line be 
tween doing their job of integration so well that the particularistic needs of 
their community disappeared or so poorly that they were unable to func 
tion as bridges. This was a task fraught with contradictions, as working 
class disputes threatened the delicately managed relations between immi 
grant elites and American local elites, as working-class immigrants often 
rebelled against the leadership of their "betters," and as the insistent pull 
of nationalism raised questions about immigrants' loyalty to the United 
States. 
All these issues directly affected the intersecting and overlapping rela 
tionships among immigrant workers, immigrant elites, American workers, 
and American elites. Here the tensions inherent in being ethnic and be 
coming American reveal themselves. The contradiction between the collec 
tivist mores of the immigrant community and the individualist ideals of the 
American world confronted all ethnics during the adaptation process. No 
one more fully embodied this contradiction than the ethnic leader. The 
business success of this ethnic middle class?merchants, saloonkeepers, 
immigrant bankers, some fraternal officers, and a new group of profession 
als (including clergy)?was due, of course, to the ready consumer market 
the immigrant community represented, a fact that kept this middle class 
bound to these communities. But leadership of one's ethnic group de 
pended not only on one's financial standing and perceived links to the 
American world but also on a community judgment about how one re 
spected and lived the immigrant culture. The success of these men required 
that they express both their loyalty to their community and their agreement 
with the basic aims of the American mainstream.19 
Concern for their community's well-being could lead to ethnic elites' 
awareness of working-class issues, especially in heavily blue-collar cities 
and towns. "My people do not live in America, they live underneath Amer 
ica," a Ruthenian Greek Catholic priest in Yonkers told social worker 
Emily Greene Balch. "America does not begin till a man ... is earning 
two dollars a day. A laborer cannot afford to be an American."20 Finding 
work and negotiating with the American legal system were two areas where 
immigrants needed assistance. Padrones and other labor brokers were of 
ten able to use entrepreneurial skill, economic defense of the community, 
and contact with Americans to reach an esteemed position among their 
own. Clergy and fraternal leaders could be rallied through community 
pressure to the cause of workers' self-advancement, but it was more often 
the case that elites provided a moderating influence on their community. 
In the immigrant years, ethnic notables often encouraged ethnic 
nationalist identity in their people to overcome localism and rally their 
communities, using American political ideals like independence and citi 
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zenship. Ethnicity in the American context, rather than being a defense 
mechanism against 
a hostile host community, was an assertive awareness of 
connections among immigrants and was related to the rising tide of nation 
alism in Europe, especially among minority peoples. The "imagined com 
munity" of the nation was a new force that expressed itself in the United 
States as "new-ethnic" federations rallied around the goal of carving inde 
pendent nations in their homelands from the existing empires. These feder 
ations, merging existing local fraternal societies into a national organiza 
tion, often combined both the socioeconomic aspirations of their 
proletarian members and a new political awareness both of the United 
States and the Old Country. They also became organizational weapons 
with which ethnic elites could both confirm the "ethnic" unities of their 
communities and represent those ethnics to the American host society even 
as they retained ties to the homeland.21 
The histories and cultures of the regions of Europe gave a distinct spin 
to each nationalist vision and created divisions within these communities. 
It is a serious mistake to assume that these communities were monolithic, 
either in class or in definitions of ethnicity, or that they all made similar 
uses of American political ideals. We can discern three main types of 
nationalist impulses in the American immigrant case: (1) a pluralist nation 
alism that appealed to common geographic origins and history irrespective 
of religion or even mother tongue; (2) an integral nationalism that de 
manded language or religious unity; and (3) a socialist nationalism that 
explicitly tied nationalist aspirations to class goals. These different nation 
alist models were reflected in the ethnic federations set up in the United 
States between the 1880s and World War I. 
For example, the Polish Roman Catholic Union (PRCU), which was 
founded in 1873 and dominated by priests who tied Polishness to Catholic 
ness, represented an integral nationalism. In opposition, other Polish com 
munity leaders gathered in Chicago in 1880 to found the Polish National 
Alliance (PNA), which saw the American Polish immigrant communities 
("Polonia") as the "Fourth Province of Poland." The Fourth Province's 
mission was to combine with the three partitioned parts of historic Poland 
to fight for a free and unified homeland. In this pluralist-nationalist mod 
el, the PNA was secular and nondiscriminatory, even allowing Jews to join 
(though doubtless few did). The PNA was the more popular organization 
in Polonia; after 1896 the PNA always had a significantly larger member 
ship than the PRCU. Further complications in the Polish case stemmed 
from religious differences: An independent Catholic movement, the Polish 
National Catholic Church, split from Rome and contended that Polish 
Roman Catholics were not nationalist or democratic enough. With a 
founder who espoused a democratic creed and a peasant-populist rhetoric, 
the Polish National Church had its greatest support in the coal-mining 
region of eastern Pennsylvania; little is known, however, about its relation 
ship to the budding union movement there. The Polish Socialist Alliance 
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(PSA), admittedly a small segment of Polonia, dreamed of a future of 
political and economic reconstruction of an independent Poland. "In view 
of our weak direct participation in the political life of this country [the 
United States]," the PSA argued that its members should prepare them 
selves for their place in the new Poland.22 
How to create American citizens of these masses was the nub of the 
problem in pre-World War I immigrant communities for both American 
officials and ethnic elites. The dilemma for ethnic elites was whether to 
encourage settlement and American citizenship, which would enhance 
their influence in American politics, or to focus on homeland issues. Politi 
cal parties approached ethnic elites in order to encourage and absorb new 
voters. Here was the famous urban machine at work, and yet it met with 
only limited success in this era. First, the already-mobilized voters in the 
mainstream parties were reluctant to make room for the newcomers; both 
prejudice and a limit to patronage bounty were the key factors here. 
Second, ethnic elites found it difficult to mobilize their own people in this 
migrant era. Moreover, they also tended to involve only those who could 
be trusted to vote "the right way." 
Most Eastern and Southern European immigrants did not expect to 
settle permanently in the United States. Indeed, estimated rates of return 
for these turn-of-the-century migrants to the United States ranged between 
50 percent of southern Italians and 35 percent for Poles; even 20 percent of 
Eastern European Jews (the most likely to be permanent) returned be 
tween 1880 and 1900. Thus community turnover in U.S. cities was high.23 
Moreover, naturalization rates lagged, even though growing nativist senti 
ment after the 1890s demanded that immigrants assimilate, and immigra 
tion was restricted in 1921. Of the adult foreign-born population in 1920, 
only 49 percent were naturalized; a decade later, at the beginning of the 
New Deal realignment, that figure had only risen to 57.6 percent.24 
At this point, we must turn to evidence from one city to examine the 
particular dynamics of these immigrant communities as played out in poli 
tics. The case of Bridgeport, Connecticut, a midsized industrial city, pro 
vides a wealth of information on ethnic political activity in this era. An 
immigrant city, Bridgeport had a diversified economic base that empha 
sized metal-working. It was the foremost American munitions center dur 
ing World War I, earning it the nickname "The Essen of America." Its 
wartime prominence led to national concern over both its ethnic commu 
nity activities and its labor disputes.25 
Ethnic elites rose to prominence in Bridgeport new-immigrant com 
munities through the usual paths of entrepreneurship, concern for their 
community's well-being, and political savvy. For example, the padrone 
Louis Richards (Luigi Ricciardo as he advertised himself in the city's Ital 
ian newspapers) turned a rivalry with a Boston padrone into a crusade 
on behalf of Bridgeport Italian workers and succeeded in getting state 
legislation passed that regulated padrones. He turned these contacts, plus 
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his court interpreting for immigrants, into a role in the local Republican 
party. 
Similarly, but with more conservative consequences, three Hungarian 
community leaders resolved a labor dispute in 1907. One thousand Hun 
garian workers led by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) had 
struck the American Tube & Stamping Company (AT&S) in a dispute over 
wages and hours. The strike soon became a solid community cause. After a 
prolonged stalemate in which managers refused to meet with IWW orga 
nizers, three Hungarian businessmen volunteered to meet with AT&S 
management. They gained only the reinstatement of the strikers and a 
promise for arbitration on wages in the future. After intense debate and a 
slim majority vote, the strikers decided to return to work. The three nota 
bles, however, had demonstrated their mediating ability and their moderat 
ing influence. They all went on to roles in the local Republican party.26 
Thus through business acumen, sensitivity to the economic survival needs 
of the group, and astute maneuvering within political-party spheres, immi 
grant leaders molded their community's structure and negotiated their 
members' relationships with the local state. 
Ethnic notables were instrumental in maneuvering their compatriots 
through the legal process to become citizens. As Louis Richards, the "pap 
pa" of the Bridgeport Italian community, explained: 
When I started to take hold of matters of the Italians in this city I was able to 
push many of them through. There were times that I knew how hard it was for 
some of these to go through the strict [citizenship] test, but I also knew that these 
people would make darned good citizens even if they could not read and write 
well.27 
Ethnic leaders had to urge their communities to pay attention to the posi 
tive effect of political clout. As one New York City Italian paper argued, 
"We must organize our forces as the Jews do, persist in exhausting that 
which constitutes gain for our race over the Anglo-Saxon race."28 Here we 
have evidence that the American system of patronage politics, with its 
emphasis on individual or group enhancement over that of the public good, 
had been learned well by these ethnic leaders. 
But these efforts were insufficient in the immigrant era, because immi 
grants who decided to stay in the United States took an average of ten to 
twelve years from their arrival to make application for citizenship.29 The 
large numbers of sojourners among them made the immigrant era a diffi 
cult one for ethnic political clout. This does not mean that immigrant 
communities, or at least their notables, were devoid of American patrio 
tism. Italian pioneers in Bridgeport were so taken with the United States's 
participation in the Spanish-American War that they named their new 
fraternal society?the first Italian one in the city in 1898?the George 
Dewey Sick Benefit Society. Similarly, the Polish Falcons national head 
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quarters had to persuade their members not to join the American army in 
enthusiastic support of democratic goals in the Caribbean but rather to 
wait patiently for their opportunity to enlist in the democratic liberation of 
Poland. Here we cannot separate out intentions?either the goal of gaining 
instant American citizenship (available to anyone who completed his tour 
of duty), the enthusiasm for democracy that seems to have animated the 
Falcons' membership, or the simple thrill of military adventure.30 
Group identification and organization, outsider status in America, 
domination of the majority proletarian community by middle-class nota 
bles, and a growing nationalist awareness were intensified and challenged 
during World War I. The nationalist impulse?which caused aliens to re 
spond to call-ups from imperial armies or to volunteer for their homeland's 
liberation armies, and moved their communities to raise money for Eu 
ropean victims of the conflict?clashed with a coercive American patrio 
tism that heightened nativism. Complicating the picture were the waves of 
strikes that involved hundreds of thousands of workers, both American 
and immigrant, skilled and unskilled. This situation panicked ethnic nota 
bles who tried to maneuver between the rocks of nativism and intolerance 
in American society and the shoals of class conflict. 
Ethnic notables worried that mounting class grievances within the 
immigrant working class threatened to mix with nationalist aspirations and 
possibly to supercede nationality issues entirely. Radical ethnic leaders 
appeared to lead during these times, and moderate middle-class leaders 
retreated. Unionizing workers used the rhetoric of democracy to assert 
themselves and their grievances, even before the United States entered the 
war and provided Americans with democratic rhetoric to use. Strikers 
mixed symbols of ethnic nationalism with Americanism. For example, in 
1915 striking Italian workers marched through downtown Bridgeport carry 
ing both Italian and American flags. 
Once the United States entered the war, immigrants whose homelands 
were U.S. allies had an easier time justifying their dual loyalty than those 
who were from the Central Powers. Ethnic leaders pressed the cause of 
homeland independence, influencing President Woodrow Wilson's foreign 
policy. It should be noted that "old-stock" groups?Germans uniformly 
suspected of being traitors and the Irish caught between the U.S. alliance 
with Britain and their own hopes for an independent Ireland?were part of 
this process as well. All, however, were urged to proclaim loyalty to the 
United States alone. As one Bridgeport editorial proclaimed even before 
the United States entered the war, "If you are in America now, whether 
born here or not, stand by the American flag, the American people, or get 
out. . . . You can't serve two countries. You must be either American or 
not American."31 This was echoed in the "100% Americanism" drives 
sponsored by employers, many of whom announced that they would only 
employ United States citizens or those who had taken out "first papers." 
The government's Committee on Public Information, which managed the 
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propaganda effort for the war, had a less coercive approach but nonethe 
less encouraged Americanization. 
At war's end, debate over the Treaty of Versailles and the League of 
Nations, as well as immigrants' concern for the fates of family in the Old 
Country, kept attention riveted on Europe. At the same time, both native 
born and immigrant workers engaged in the largest strike wave to date to 
keep their wartime gains and to push for unionism in basic industry. Only 
with resolution of European issues and the defeat of the postwar strikes by 
a combination of the Red Scare and Open Shop Drive did the American 
working class settle into a (remarkably) quiescent era. The immigrant 
workers who had briefly found interethnic unity in the 1919 strikes were 
left to retreat to their separate nationalist tents.32 
After World War I, middle-class ethnic leaders found it safer to con 
centrate on ethnicity and citizenship in the American setting since Eu 
ropean affairs had changed drastically and since immigration was now 
restricted. The immigrant communities took on the task of Americaniza 
tion themselves, while still attempting to retain their own ethnic identity. 
Rather than a simple dualism of ethnic versus American, the 1920s wit 
nessed the redefinition of ethnicity as immigrant culture, heritage, and 
behaviors mingled with American expectations and emerging mass culture. 
On the most particularistic level, this redefinition of ethnicity meant that 
ethnics would pick and choose which aspects of immigrant culture to 
retain?whether to cook traditional or cook "American," buy from a local 
grocer of one's ethnic group or from an American store, or whether to 
merge regional/provincial sensibilities into an all-encompassing ethnic fed 
eration. On the broader level, they had the task of both justifying their 
ethnic heritage and claiming a permanent place in America. Finally, ethnic 
institutions had to create various ways of attracting the second generation. 
In the 1920s this question of generating new values, ones that subtly 
moved away from the collectivist working-class value system of many mem 
bers even as they appeared to uphold them, was contested terrain. On the 
plane of high politics, American hostility toward radicalism and American 
disillusionment with the results of the Versailles Treaty dovetailed with the 
concerns of ethnic elites over the political and ideological issues that had 
split communities prior to the war. Ethnic leaders now championed a safe 
middle-class nationalism that jibed well with mainstream American inter 
ests. Ethnic elites used a "fashionable nationalism" as a rallying call in their 
battles with opponents from within.33 The pre-war tensions, such as secular 
versus religious, nationalist versus assimilationist, support for American 
business or for trade unions, continued. 
For most Eastern European community leaders, there was 
no choice 
but to take sides in the postwar political struggles in the homeland. To be 
on the "right" side was also to be in alignment with, or at least not in overt 
disagreement with, U.S. government foreign-policy positions. Thus they 
could express alarm over events in the homeland while urging their coun 
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trymen to settle into their new home. For example, Polish-American lead 
ers, dismayed over the politics of the "socialist" Pilsudski government in 
the 1920s, turned inward and focused on making their way in American 
society. "Wychodztwo dla wychodztwa" "the emigrants for themselves," 
became the dominant Polish-American slogan, wielded by Polish grocers 
and businessmen as an expression of their desire to keep their community 
close about them. It might usefully have served as well as a slogan for most 
East European ethnic elites in the 1920s. Similarly, the dispute over sup 
port for Poland became mixed with union agitation within the Polish Na 
tional Alliance. Here, Polish socialists contended for national office against 
"the Polish bankers, lawyers, doctors, and businessmen" who ran the PNA 
and won one election in 1927. The Left-Right splits in the PNA continued 
until the early 1930s. Moreover, ethnic elites were also sorting themselves 
out into new groupings based on ethnicity and social status, highlighting 
class stratification within their communities. Ironically, ethnic leaders who 
were decidedly nondemocratic but of middle-class standing, even those 
who supported restored monarchies as in the Hungarian and Russian com 
munities, were given great attention by the American press and politicians 
not because they championed democratic "American" values but because 
they represented an antiradical, antilabor bulwark.34 
If the 1920s was the Golden Age of ethnicity, as the proliferation of 
ethnic organizations, newspapers, ad memberships indicates, it was also a 
time when ethnic leaders of Eastern and Southern European groups began 
making their presence known in American politics. Some ethnic politi 
cians, including those of the up-and-coming second generation, sought 
further recognition from the traditional American parties by forming their 
own partisan clubs within the parties. Other community leaders formed 
general citizenship clubs as part of the Americanization process. For exam 
ple, in a direct repudiation of patronage politics, the Chicago-based Na 
tional Slovak Alliance, with the slogan "All for Good Citizenship," aimed 
to educate "progressive citizens who place the general welfare before per 
sonal aggrandizement." Similarly, the Bridgeport Hungarian Civic Club 
aimed to promote nonpartisan citizenship awareness. The Arctic Street 
Civic Club hoped to do the same in its Slovak neighborhood. Some groups 
rejected ethnic appeals; as one leader of a Bridgeport lodge of B'nai B'rith 
explained in 1925, "The Jews vote as American citizens only?and not as a 
class or religious body," while the Bridgeport Swedish-American Associa 
tion declared that "A plea to national pride or prejudice is un-American." 
These statements reveal that ethnics were particularly sensitive to being 
viewed as mere "interest groups," even as ethnic interest in politics was 
rising and ethnic issues loomed large in the Tribal Twenties.35 
Nonetheless, large numbers of immigrants remained unmobilized 
electorally, and a second generation was coming of age. The 1928 presiden 
tial campaign came at the right time to generate an upsurge in voter inter 
est and voter registration. Support for the Democratic candidate, Al 
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Smith, was as much an effect as the cause of this new mobilization. As 
Allan Lichtman has discovered, religion alone, rather than a holistic ethno 
cultural worldview, correlated most strongly with the Smith vote, as did 
socioeconomic status. The large number of newly engaged foreign-stock 
voters who entered the electoral system still waited to be absorbed by the 
Democratic party after 1928, a task that proved difficult to do using a 
patronage model since local Irish Democrats were often unwilling to part 
with patronage rewards and the Great Depression intervened to make 
economic issues paramount.36 
With the onset of economic difficulties, this new generation of citizens 
mixed their notions of the public good, "good citizenship," and the antipa 
tronage sensibility of working-class reform. Foreign-stock voters de 
manded government protection, free of partisan favoritism, from the disas 
trous effects of unemployment. At stake in the early depression was the 
"serviceability of organized government"37 in the face of upper-class de 
mands for pared-down government and privatized relief. In Bridgeport, 
foreign-stock, working-class homeowners supported a Socialist party mu 
nicipal ticket in their vision of a public good that included expanded work 
relief and other city services, fair taxation, support for unionization, and 
public accountability for elected representatives. The Bridgeport Socialist 
party won on these themes combined with an antipatronage message. This 
suggests the need for further investigation of the other examples of tax 
revolts and successful working-class municipal campaigns to see whether 
an alternative political culture of working-class citizenry was being shaped, 
which in turn helped to shape the emerging New Deal.38 
The rhetoric of industrial democracy that animated the labor legisla 
tion of the New Deal era, language that had its origins in the labor de 
mands of World War I and in the repudiation of Hoover's "rugged individu 
alism," had its counterpart in the call for expanded political democracy. 
Foreign-stock citizens demanded entry into the political process, resisted the 
call for removal of citizenship rights from people on relief (a throwback to 
the nineteenth-century practice), and demanded their rights in the work 
place as well. As one observer of the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO) noted, "This new unionism does not stop at the formal lodge meeting. 
It sees the union as a way of life which involves the whole community."39 
If class-based voting emerged during the 1930s, it was in competition 
with traditional patronage politics, now expanded to include the new eth 
nics. The "machine" has received much attention (mostly asking whether it 
disappeared during the New Deal) but ethnic appeals to partisanship re 
mained strong and were even enhanced in this era of foreign-stock mobiliz 
ation. Patronage democracy was bolstered by the growing government wel 
fare programs, which were deliberately used by local and state politicians 
to cement voter allegiance and to undercut independent parties.40 
In addition, federal regulations forced the foreign-born who applied 
for relief to become citizens, thereby adding to the eligible electorate. 
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New-ethnic political muscle, first flexed during the 1928 presidential cam 
paign, reordered local and state politics in the mid-1930s, at the same time 
as ethnic pride swept immigrant cities. Building on the ethnic political 
arrangements of the pre-war era and the 1920s, traditional ethnic leaders, 
who were being threatened with displacement by class politics and the 
assimilation of the second generation, now secured their links with the new 
political order. 
A growing Americanism pervaded many ethnic communities during 
the early depression. In 1932, at a Pulaski Day celebration held by the 
Bridgeport branch of the Polish National Alliance, one leader proclaimed 
his pride that his countrymen Casimir Pulaski and Thaddeus Kosciusko had 
participated in the American Revolution, 
and thereby carved on the foundation stones of our national structure the birth 
right of our countrymen to the enjoyment of the liberties and the opportunities 
which this nation and its vast territory offers to the various people of Europe, 
who have come here to develop and finally possess it. 
He then went on to list the attributes that makes Poles "good citizens": 
being part of the "great army of labor" that built America, building 
churches and schools, and contributing a growing number of business and 
professional men.41 Similarly that same fall, Hungarians, noting that two of 
their ancestors had taken part in the American Revolution, participated in 
the city's George Washington Bicentennial Birthday parade. For their part, 
Slovaks combined the Washington bicentennial with the anniversary cele 
bration of their Czecho-Slovakian Republic constitution.42 
The rhetoric of Americanism and democracy mixed with a concern to 
preserve the Polish language in the move by some to desert the Roman 
Catholic Polish parish in Bridgeport for the Polish National Catholic 
Church. Citing the practice of demanding money for religious services as 
well as the past alliance between the Polish Roman Catholic pastor and 
local Republicans, "the smarter people," those "against all the hockus 
pockus [sic] of the Catholic religion, 
" 
and those "believ[ing] in greater 
democracy in the Church" moved to the National Catholic Church where 
the Mass was in Polish, not Latin.43 
A growing pluralism accompanied New Deal politics and local socialist 
politics in Bridgeport. The 1935 Connecticut Tercentenary in Bridgeport 
and the 1936 Bridgeport Centennial portrayed and celebrated ethnic diver 
sity, with ethnic days and nationality parades mixed with Yankee colonial 
memorials. In subsequent years, various ethnicities continued their Annual 
Day as a way to celebrate their existence in America and to bridge the 
distances between the various organizations within their group. Politicians 
from all parties dutifully attended.44 
A variety of new ethnic veterans' organizations sprang up?the Jewish 
War Veterans, Czecho-Slovak Legionnaires, American Veterans of Slovak 
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Extraction, Italian War Veterans, Lithuanian Legion of America?that 
celebrated their participation in either the U.S. military or the liberation 
army of their homelands to make the world "safe for democracy." In 1934, 
Bridgeport Czecho-Slovakians celebrated the anniversary of the signing of 
the Czecho-Slovak constitution, praising "its success as the only democracy 
among neighboring dictatorships." This observance is all the more mean 
ingful and indicative of this community's political values, since in the 1920s 
the Bridgeport Slovaks had been split between the Catholics who had 
wanted an autonomous Slovakia and the Protestants who supported the 
1918 constitution.45 
More problematic, however, was the Italian War Veterans' 1935 cele 
bration of the entrance of Italy into the war twenty years earlier. "We are 
not here today only to celebrate an anniversary 
. . . but to celebrate also 
the birth of a new Italian civilization on the earth," proclaimed a 
Bridgeport Italian notable. The Italian community's support for Mussolini, 
who arguably was the first to tap southern Italians' sense of nationalism, 
was acceptable to many American businessmen and politicians who were 
also supportive of Mussolini, but it represented a worrisome trend for 
Italian-American leftists and unionists who set up national antifascist com 
mittees. The massive rallies held in Italian-American communities when 
Italy invaded Ethiopia, and the ardor with which women gave up their gold 
wedding rings to II Duce's military adventures, hinted that Italians were a 
politically volatile community in the United States. Italians were never a 
secure part of the New Deal coalition. Similarly, monarchists in the Hun 
garian community, as well as some disgruntled Slovak autonomists, pro 
vided a base for a growing anti-Semitism and conservative politics in 
Bridgeport in the late 1930s. Ethnic identification could cut two ways, both 
liberal and right-wing.46 
As the electoral campaign season got underway in the fall of 1937, the 
Bridgeport Times-Star asked its local readers, "Do People Vote by Racial 
Blocs at Present?" The answer was equivocal, evidencing both class-based 
rationales mixed with ethnic propensities and responses from the "new 
generation," which protested that the question implied that they were 
"pro-nationality, rather than American."47 The second generation 
was 
finding its place via a redefined Americanism, one that accepted "hyphen 
ate Americans" as legitimate citizens. As Dobie, the fictional Slovak 
American steelworker, mused in Out of This Furnace, Thomas Bell's saga 
of the Monongahela Valley, 
Made in the U.S.A., made in the First Ward. But it wasn't where you were born 
or how you spelled your name or where your father had come from. It was the 
way you thought and felt about certain things. About freedom of speech and the 
equality of men and the importance of having 
one law?the same law?for rich 
and poor, for the people you liked and the people you didn't like.48 
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Thus by the 1930s, foreign-stock, working-class Americans had moved 
from exclusion from citizenship and unionism to be part of a growing 
industrial union movement that provided an avenue for a class-based en 
trance into electoral politics. However, this vision of the worker-citizen, 
expressed in a language of industrial democracy, was challenged by a more 
traditional approach to politics, which spoke the language of patronage 
democracy and used ethnic appeals to incorporate working-class citizens 
into a web of clientilistic relationships with bourgeois ethnic leaders. While 
some ethnic-affiliative networks provided the backbone for the CIO efforts 
in many northern cities, ethnicity was also a pathway for cross-class alli 
ances with reactionary national and international ideologies. A pluralist 
vision of America mixed uneasily with an internally intolerant ethnic ideal, 
reminiscent of the pre-World War I integral nationalism. The defeat of 
working-class politics in the postwar era was rooted in the mixed legacy of 
this pattern of inclusion, along with the racial dynamic that still excluded 
African Americans and other people of color. 
This investigation of one industrial city's experience with working 
class politics during the Progressive Era and early New Deal suggests a 
number of qualifications to the "System of 1896" thesis. First, the System 
of 1896 was not as stable and secure as its theorists have contended. It was 
repeatedly challenged by third parties, and the issues that these challenges 
brought to the public sphere reshaped working-class political loyalties and 
in the process reshaped the general policies pursued by the mainstream 
parties. Second, there is little room for immigrant working-class politics 
within this framework. Scholars have argued over the nature of the labor 
consciousness of the early twentieth century and especially the 1930s, par 
ticularly that of new-immigrant workers who are seen to be motivated 
more by the search for security than the search for power in the work 
place.49 The political demands raised by working people in Bridgeport and 
other cities during the 1930s regarding democracy, social policy, taxes, 
budgets, and unemployment relief demonstrated their search for "social 
citizenship," which reflected a consciousness that combined the goals of 
security and power. This working-class consciousness played a major role 
in the shaping of social legislation in the mid-twentieth century. However, 
the dual nature of working-class inclusion in the American polity, that of 
patronage or of class, limited the effectiveness of working-class political 
power in this and subsequent eras. 
The colloquium raised a number of issues that are seen more clearly 
when viewed through the lens of the American case?which provides a 
perspective and experience both unique and instructive. The structure of 
politics in the United States, with its distinct levels of local, state, and 
national government, allowed workers to exercise active citizenship at the 
local level, arguably the most important level until the early twentieth 
century. In particular, the process of inclusion or exclusion of workers in 
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the American polity was related to the shaping of the American working 
class by immigration. The machinery of the state and of parties emphasized 
ethnicity and ethnic voting power and could be used to fashion successful 
challenges to local political authorities. Finally, the malleability of the 
concept of "American," shaped as it was by the social and political activ 
ities of immigrant workers, gave the notion of citizenship in the United 
States a flexibility that it has had in few other nations. 
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